Introducción
Environmental policies provide benefits to society which have to be considered in order to undertake efficient measures. Altruism can explain some of these benefits and therefore the amount people are willing to pay for policy actions. The value of altruism is the result of people being concern for the welfare of others. There are several types of altruism based on the type of good which enters the utility function of the individual, as outlined by Andreoni (1990) and Johansson (1995) . Altruism is said to be paternalistic if the individual is concerned with other individuals' income or with some other commodity to be consumed by others, for instance, health. Pure altruism occurs when the individual is concerned only with the levels of utility of other individuals, irrespective of how these levels are attained. Bergstrom (1992) and Jones-Lee (1991 , 1992 showed that pure altruism is not relevant for cost-benefit analysis and its inclusion would lead to double counting.
The types of altruism also imply some assumptions about how the rest of society would behave with regard to the public good or environmental policy. Paternalistic altruism assumes that the rest of individuals in society are also contributors to the public good (Johanson (1994)). However, pure altruism involves the assumption that the rest of individuals in society would not contribute to the public good, while impure altruism assumes that the individual also cares for the amount privately given to the public good (Andreoni (1990) ). On the other hand, Johannesson et al. (1995) argued that the value of altruism could depend on the expectations about the net benefits that the receipent population would receive from the policy option. Empir-ical evidence on the value of altruism is provided by Viscusi et al. (1988) for the health risks from hazardous substances, and by Johannesson et al.
(1995) for the value of safety.
Since altruism is a type of non-use value, its evaluation requires nonmarket valuation methods which do not rely on observed market transactions. This paper contributes to the investigation on the different types of paternalistic altruism by utilizing a multiple valuation approach based on the stated preference method of contingent choice or choice experiment. Past research on the value of altruism have predominantly used straightforward contingent valuation methods which are limited to value complex situations and public goods involving multiple attributes. Choice experiments consists of putting subjects in the situation of choosing among alternative policy options with different attribute levels. This technique is suitable to disentangle different types of altruism with regard to the environmental policy and the benefits to be received by the relevant population. Our experiment allows us to jointly evaluate policies towards reducing environmental health effects and alternative policies directed to increasing income and public facilities.
The application focuses on the health effects caused by the emissions from a large power plant. The economic benefits of policy measures for reducing pollution could be relevant not only to the affected population but also to other people who are not subject to its adverse effects. This issue is empirically investigated by eliciting the values placed by an urban population that is not received air emissions. The results show that altruistic values are relevant and significantly different from zero, and involve not only a concern for health effects but also for the income level of the affected population.
Data sources
The study of altruistic values is based on data obtained with a choice experiment survey in Las Palmas de Gran Canaria (Spain) in 2001. This is the largest city in the island of Gran Canaria with a population of 540.000 inhabitants. The city is the largest consumer of electricity in the island, which is provided by a large power plant based on fuel and gas consumption.
Because of the direction of the winds, the particulates and other emissions of the power plant are drawn towards Jinamar, a nearby suburb which is about 7 km. south of Las Palmas and partially belongs to another large municipality. This is a marginal suburb with important social problems and an average low income level.
The policy proposal to be investigated consisted of specific measures to reduce the health effects from pollution caused by the power plant. These measures involved the installation of filters for the reduction of emissions of particulates and other gases causing negative health effects. The objective was to reduce the probability of becoming ill or having some episode of respiratory illness. Two focus groups with individuals from the objective population were conducted which allowed us to specify the relevant attributes, their levels, the payment vehicle, the relevant policy option, and the effectiveness of the communication devices.
The pollution problem was also studied by consulting a group of experts (doctors, health authorities and social workers) with the aim of obtaining qualitative and quantitative assessments of health effects. Other quantitative data were also obtained from available reports on the area. These studies concluded that pollution levels use to exceed regulatory limits in the polluted area, and that respiratory illnesses were more prevalent than in other areas.
As a result of discussions in focus groups and expert opinion, the health effects were reduced to three basic dimensions. These constitute the attributes which were considered relevant from the perception of the affected population. Table 1 presents the specification of the selected attributes and their levels. For the health effects, the attributes selected for the study were the risk of becoming ill or having an episode of respiratory illness, the duration of the episodes and the activity restrictions caused by the episode. Two other attributes were also included in relation to other types of altruism that the objective population could show for policy proposals in the study area.
These are the money income supplement and the social policy. The former was intended to raise the income level of the people in the study area, while the latter pretended investment in public facilities for education and leisure. The group of five attributes defining the policy options was complemented by a sixth attribute specifying its total cost. This is the amount the subject would have to pay if the policy option was carried out based on the definition and particular levels of the rest of attributes. Because the negative perception of income taxes, the payment vehicle was defined as an annual contribution to a specific fund for financing both the health and social policies considered in the option. The levels of this attribute were obtained from the analysis of the responses to the pre-test data of an open-ended WTP question for the alternative policy options, and tested in focus groups. In order to reduce protest responses because of the possible opinion that the firms causing pollution should be made responsible for its costs, it was stated that costs would be equally shared by the firms and the population of Gran Canaria if the policy option was passed.
Particular attention was given to the specification of the scenario for the pollution problem and the context of altruism, as well as the effectiveness of the communication devices. The Appendix presents the wordings of the valuation scenario and an example of a choice card utilized in the study. Each of the attributes and levels were described both verbally and with the aid of color diagrams before the full choice card with policy options were put to the subject. Each choice card consisted of three alternatives. Two of them were policy options defined by a particular combination of the levels of the six attributes. The last option was the status quo, which was defined as a 40% risk of becoming ill, one week duration, severe restrictions of activity, zero cost and none of the social or income policies. The risk reduction levels were communicated by icons describing the relative number of people affected in a scale of one to ten. These illustrative devices were proved in focus groups and pre-test studies to be effective in communicating risk changes.
The attributes considered in this study and their levels lead to 32·42·22=574 potential combinations. Since it is not cognitively feasible for the subject to compare all these options there is need to scale down the number of alter-natives. The set of policy options for the choice experiment was obtained by a D-optimal design (Huber and Zwerina (1996) ) obtained from the full factorial with restrictions. This method is based on the maximization of the information matrix for the least square estimators of the parameter vector for the attributes set. The result is a reduced number of orthogonal profiles or policy options from the full factorial design, which were randomly combined in groups of two in order to build up the choice sets which are shown to the subject, after adding the status quo option in every set. The D-optimal design led to 20 profiles which were inserted in 10 different blocks or choice sets of pairs of profiles. Each subject received 8 choice sets taken from the optimal design, were one of them was intentionally repeated for consistency testing. In order to distribute the full design across the sample, the choice sets were randomly distributed in three different subsamples.
The questionnaire contained initial questions about the perception of the pollution problem by the subject, its relationship with the health status of the affected population and the social problems of the suburb. The subject was familiarized with health risks by eliciting her perception of the risks implied by several common activities, such as car traveling, smoking, eating food with additives, and breath contaminated air. These questions were followed by the description of the valuation scenario, with the presentation of the attributes, their levels and the questions about the choice sets. Each subject had the options of either choosing the status quo involving no payment for any of the policy options, or answering a "do not know/do not answer" option. Those who chose some of these options were asked for a reason.
For those who agreed to pay for some of the policy options, the study of the different types of altruism was enhanced by asking about their perception of the potential benefits to be received from the affected population in the polluted area. This question was as follows:
"Let us consider that the policy measures are carried out, and that all people of Gran Canaria, including those in Jinamar, have to pay a given amount of money, how would you think that the people of Jinamar would value these measures in comparison with what they would have to pay?"
The subject could answer whether she expect the affected population would value more, less or the same as the amount they would be required to pay. For a paternalistic altruist it would be necessary that her expected benefits to others turns out larger than the amount she expects would be required to others for the policy proposal. In order to concentrate on paternalistic altruism, it was also recalled that all the population of the island of Gran Canaria will be required to pay a given amount of money if the policy proposal is passed. Discussions in focus groups indicated that this provision rule reduced possible free riding behaviour and was seen as fair and right. The interviews were carried out by professional interviews from a survey research firm and trained in the specifics of discrete choice experiments.
Empirical models
The dicrete choice data obtained to measure altruistic preferences can be modeled with the formulation and estimation of random utilty models. Let us consider that there are a number of individuals (q = 1, ..., Q), who are assumed to be utility maximizers and face a number of alternatives j = 1, ..., J, from the choice set C, given the income constraint. Let x be a vector of market goods with price p x , and s j is a vector of of attribute levels of alternative j. Let also y q be individual's income and p j the cost of alternative j (i.e. one of the elements of s j ). The problem for the individidual q is to solve the following maximization problem:
where U (·) is the utilty function. For each alternative, the indirect utility function V = V (s jq , y q ) depends on the levels of the attributes s of alternative j, the socieconomic characteristics of the subject and the income level. However, the researcher does not know for certain function V but a desterministic component v [ Thurstone (1927) ]. Thus, indirect utility can be written as
where ε jq is the random term which can explain, for instance, that identical subjects realize different choices because of unobserved behavioural or intrinsic characteristics. This random compontent accounts for measurement errors and unobserved preferences or attributes, and allows the researcher to conduct inference on indivividuals' preferences (Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985)).
The subject would choose option i to any j in choice set C if V (i) > V (j), (1984) ]. The probability of choosing alternative i is
The deterministic component can be expressed as a lineal function of ex-planatory variables [Laureau and Rae (1985) , Smith and Desvousges (1986)]:
where α is the specific constant for each alternative, β is a vector of utility coeffcients associated with the vector s of explanatory variables, γ is the price coefficient of alternative.
There Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985)]. The probability of choosing alternative i is,
The scale parameter µ is commonly assumed to equal to 1 [Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985)], hence
where α is a constant term.
The measure of the monetary benefits from a change in utilility [Hanemann (1984)] is defined as
and the marginal value for a single attribute s z is
where γ p is the coefficient of the price attribute. The average value of alternative j is
The problem with the model outlined above is that it is subject to the property of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). This means that the ratio of the probability of any two alternatives is indepdent of any other alternative. The implications is that the models cannot account for preference heterogeneity across individuals, and therefore the variance of the random component is constant across the alternatives. This property can be proved by utilizing the test of Hausman and McFadden (1984) .The test statisics is:
where u and r refer to the unrestricted model and the restricted model under the assumption that one of the alternatives is not considered respectively, b is a vector of estimated parameters and Ω is the variance-covariance matrix.
In this paper we consider two alternative models which allows us to bypass the IIA assumption. The first is the random parameters logit (RPL) model [Bath (1997) , McFadden y Train (1996)]. The indirect utilility function is defined as:
where α jq is an alternative specific constant, ϕ j is a vector of non-random parameters, β jq is a vector of random parameters which vary across individuals, es un vector de parámetros aleatoriamente distribuídos entre los individuos with distribution µ q , which is specific for each indivdiual. µ q is assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and unitary variance, and reflects individual unobserved heterogeneity. s jq and w jq are vectors of specific attributes for each alterantive and each individual, and z q is a vector of socio-economic characteristics.
The probabiity that individual q chooses option i is,
e (α jq +ϕ j w jq +β jq s jq +ξ j z q +γ(y q −P j ))
.
A subset of α jq y β jq is randomly distributed between the individuals, so that for each random parameter, a new random parameter ρ kj is defined as a function of indivdiual's characteristics which do not vary for each choice decision. The functional form for these random parameters can be assumed lognormal, i.e.
where m j is a vector of characteristics which do not vary for each choice and which represent the heterogeneity between individuals. This allows for correlation between the alternatives [Bath (1997) ], breaking down the IIA assumption. γ k is a constant term, δ k is a vector of parameters which identify the mean for each individual, and µ kj is the random term with a standard normal distribution. Thus, σ k is the standard deviation of the marginal distribution of ρ kj .
The RPL model is estimated by simulation of the likelihood function following, Geweke et al. (1994) . The likelihood function is:
ities can be approximated by 
The cumulative distribution function for each ε i is assumed to be extreme value with variance θ i and scale parameter λ i = 1/θ i ,
where λ i indicates that the variances can be different for each alternative of the choice set. The probability that individual q chooses optioni i is:
where f is the density function. Following Bhat (1995) and substituting z i = ε i /λ i in (17) the probabiltiy of choosing alterantive i can be written,
If the scale parameters of the random components of the alternatives are the same, then expression (18) becomes (6) The EVHL model is estimated by maximum likelihood. The likelhood function is:
with y qm defined as y qm = 1 if the subject chooses alternative i and 0 otherwise.
Results
Each subject answers questions on eight different choice sets, thus there are 2800 potential observations of individual choice available for estimation purposes. Out of the total sample, 40 percent chose the status quo option, i.e.
the current situation with no additional policy measures regarding health or social facilities. The proportion of the sample refusing to give an answer to the choice task is 16 percent, which is a reasonable rate if we consider that the environmental problem being questioned does not affect the objective population. The individuals were questioned about their uncertainty when deciding upon every choice task. The responses reveal that 84 percent of the seems to be quite clear for the subjects and they were almost certain about their final decision when facing the alternatives. Table 2 presents the definition of the variables utilized for the specification of the utility function. The attribute variables as well as other binary variables are coded by using code effects instead as conventional dummy variables. This means that the status quo level takes the value of -1 and the other levels are coded accordingly to this value. This way of coding dummy variables is convenient because it reduces correlation with the specific constant, improving estimation results for small samples (Adamowicz et al. (1994) ). Table 3 . Variables
The hypothesis of IIA for the multinomial logit model is rejected at the 95 percent level, since the chi-squared statistics for the H-M test after excluding option A from the choice sets takes the value of 15.52, which is larger than the critical value 14.06. Thus, the ratio of any two choice probabilities is not independent from the excluded alternative. Since the ML model does not account for unobserved individual heterogeneity there is need to utilize alternative models which do not rely on the IIA assumption, such as RPL and EVHL as discussed above.
The models for the utility function are estimated with a linear specification for the parameters. The results are presented in Table 3 . ASC is the alternative specific constant which takes the value of 1 if the subject chooses The results of the estimated models show that the value of altruism is relevant across the sample and can be disentangled into policies to reduce the risk of becoming ill, other health effects and social or income policies.
The estimated parameter for the social policy is negative, suggesting that individuals could present egoism for this type of policy, or at least they do not favor the realization of these policies for the well-being of the affected population. However, the estimated parameter for the income policy is positive and significant, revealing that there is paternalistic altruism with respect to income. The relative magnitude of the estimated coefficients indicate that the policy of reducing the risk of becoming ill and the limitations of illness have larger contributions to individual's utility than the income distribution policy.
The results on the hypothesis of altruism are conditioned by the expecta-tions subjects have about the net benefits of the affected population. Table   4 shows the frequency distribution of the expected net benefits across the sample. A large majority of 46 percent considered that the policy proposal would benefit the people in the polluted suburb, with a small minority of 10 percent who said that the population of concern would benefit less than the amount they would be required to pay. A proportion of 17 percent thought that the affected population would experience no net benefits at all. Thus, paternalistic altruism can be negative only for a small proportion of the sample, while it is necessarily positive for the large majority. On average, the coefficient for the net benefits variable in the estimated models is significant and positive, proving that those subjects who expect that the affected population will benefit from the policy proposal are more likely to choose some of the policy options and experience higher utility. 
Conclusions
Altruistic preferences are relevant for evaluating welfare measures if the individual is concerned with some good affecting the welfare of other individuals.
This implies paternalistic altruism as opposed to pure altruism, in which the subject is concerned only with the utility level of others, irrespectively of how it would be attained. In this paper we have investigated the hypothesis of paternalistic altruism by utilizing a choice experiment technique which allows us to consider the relationships between environmental and social policies in forming altruistic preferences. The experiment was concerned with the health effects from pollution by power production. The evidence was obtained from a population that is not negatively affected by the externality problem.
The EVHL model was able to better represent individual heterogeneity and bypass the failure of the IIA hypothesis of the ML model. The estimated models reveal that altruistic values can be explained by disposable income, the uncertainty in the response, the presence of children in the household and the opinion about the quality of air in the affected suburb. The results of the choice experiment shows that altruistic preferences are significant for the reduction of the risk of becoming ill, the duration of the episodes, and the limitations imposed by illness. In addition, a redistribution policy for increasing the income of the affected population is also a source of non-use or altruistic values. This policy was valued less than the risk reduction policy but was comparable to other dimensions of the health effects from pollution.
Overall, the sum of the values for the health attributes overcome the value of the income policy by a factor of four. Nevertheless, the redistribution policy is relevant and constitutes a complementary approach to deal with the negative externality and other social problems.
The evidence of altruistic values and preferences does not apply to a social policy of funding infrastructures for education and leisure. This policy presented a significant negative impact on utility, revealing that subjects tend to be egoistic regarding this type of policies. Further research is needed in order to provide more evidence on the nature of altruistic values and the policies for which these values are relevant. This evidence would contribute to determine the extent of the relevant market for environmental and social policies. The evaluation of these policies should take account of non use values such as paternalistic altruism when they are relevant in the population.
